In all 17 shells (16 with impact fuses, one with proximity) landed south of the compound.The second concentration was on the middle of the UN compound. At some point (it is not clear whether before or after the shelling), two or three Hizbollah entered the compound, where their families were.Thirty-six impacts were found in the Qana area. On the day of the shelling, their number is estimated to have been well over 800. When the Fijians heard the mortar being fired, they moved civilians into shelters to protect them from Israeli retaliation. The mortar was installed between 1100 and 1200 hours that day, but no action was taken by Unifil personnel to remove it.

(On 15 April, a Fijian was shot after he tried to prevent Hizbollah fighters from firing rockets.)The UN had taken in a large number of Lebanese seeking shelter from the Israeli bombardments. About 15 minutes before the shelling, they fired between five and eight rounds of 120mm mortar from 220m south-west of the centre of the compound. On the contrary, the Israeli forces had made every effort to avoid the lose of innocent lives. The incident was, therefore, all the more deeply regretted.Between 1200 and 1400, Hizbollah fighters fired two or three rockets from 350m southeast of the UN compound. Between 1230 and 1300, they fired four or five rockets from 600m south- east of the compound. The second target had been engaged by another battery, which fired 40 rounds.In response to repeated questions, the Israelis stated that there had been no Israeli aircraft, helicopters, or remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) in the air over Qana before, during or after the shelling. On 26 April, Brigadier-General David Tzur, Chief Israeli Liaison Officer to Foreign Forces, confirmed in writing that there were "no choppers or Mini-RPVs flying above the area of Qana on 18 April, before, or during the incident".The Israeli officers stated that Israeli forces were not aware at the time of the shelling that a large number of civilians had taken refuge in the compound.They emphasised it was not Israeli policy to target civilians or the UN.

(These would have enabled the Israelis to observe the target area and adjust fire.)However, General Vilnai (Deputy Chief of General Staff) promised to look into this again. Asked if he had shifted fire during the shelling, he said he had not; he added that there would have been no time to change target data.The commanding officer's replies indicated a high professional standard. Regrettably, a few rounds overshot and hit the UN compound.The commanding officer of the artillery battalion had no satisfactory explanation why so many shells had fallen some 200m north of the intended target. (Proximity fuses cause a round to explode in the air above the target; they are often used for anti-personnel fire.) The two types of fuses had been employed in random order.Convergence fire had been used so the impacts would be concentrated in the target area. This decision had not been taken lightly; officers of some seniority had been involved.The first target had been engaged by one battery.