It brought to the surface deeper processes of change in Britain's position in the world, the legacy of which the nation's leaders are still trying to work out.Nigel Ashton is the author of 'Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser', published by Macmillan, pounds 40.. As late as 1982, Britain undertook a major military operation in defence of a residual imperial commitment in the Falklands.Perhaps the importance of Suez is in fact symbolic. However, to cast it as a truly epoch-making event perhaps goes too far. The decision to dismantle the African empire, although taken in the years after Suez, was not directly contingent on it.Also, Britain proved herself capable of undertaking independent military actions in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world in the years after Suez. From this point, it is argued, the dismantling of the Empire was inevitable. Britain would now play only a subservient role to the United States in the waging of the Cold War in the Middle East and beyond.There is no doubt that the crisis is important, not least in exposing the lack of domestic consensus over imperial policy.

Within weeks of the ceasefire British troops were evacuated from Egypt and Eden resigned the premiership, to be succeeded by Macmillan.Many historians have seen the British defeat over Suez as a crucial watershed in the nation's post-war history. Much like the original decision to opt for collusion, that to cease fire can perhaps only be understood in the context of the psychological stress endured by Eden and his closest advisers. The elastic of their nerve had been stretched to its limit, and so it snapped. The vehemence of the US response in the first days of November was perhaps dictated more by the circumstantial factors of the election campaign and the Hungarian crisis than by deeper-seated US interests in the region.Even with the benefit of hindsight and access to a wide range of sources, the British decision to halt operations on 6 November remains difficult to understand. Britain, in their view, had the worst of all possible worlds.

She had acted but not succeeded; shown resolve then lost her nerve.It seems probable that if the British government had pressed ahead and faced the Eisenhower administration with the fait accompli of the removal of Nasser, US interests would have dictated acquiescence in the outcome. Weeks after the decision to cease fire was taken on 6 November, Dulles, who had been hospitalised for much of the crisis, asked an incredulous Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, why Britain had not carried the attack through Eisenhower, too, later recorded the same opinion. Early on the morning of 5 November, British paratroopers began landing near Port Said at the mouth of the canal, followed a day later by the amphibious assault.Within hours of the beginning of this phase of the crisis, the nerve of the Cabinet began to crack Harold Macmillan's nerve broke first. Charged with the task of maintaining financial stability during the crisis, he was shocked to discover that Anglo-American relations had broken down to the extent that the US administration was actively blocking his attempt to stabilise sterling.Despite the weight of international and domestic condemnation of the government's actions, it still seems extraordinary that the attack was stopped so soon after being started. The domestic consensus had fractured and huge crowds took to the streets to protest against what some described as Britain's act of war. American records show that as early as the third day of the crisis the full outline of the collusion between Britain, France and Israel was clear to Eisenhower. His outrage was deepened by the fact that he was in the final days of a re-election campaign, and by the fact that the Soviet Union chose the Suez crisis as the opportune moment to crush the reformist Nagy regime in Hungary.Nevertheless, Eden pressed ahead.